Kuwait-University-Journal-of-Law-header
Search
Journal of Law

Previous Issues

Advance Search
Year : From To Vol
Issue Discipline:
Author

Volume :18 Issue : 72 2000      Add To Cart                                                                    Download

Can an Autonomous Person be Immoral?

Auther : Michael H. Mitias

A number of philosophers have argued in the past few decades that the concept autonomy does not necessarily entail an obligation to be moral. Thus an extremely autonomous person can be highly immoral. In this view “autonomy” is supreme value. For example in Autonomy: An Essay in Philosophical Psychology and Ethics, Lawrence Haworth argues that it is not obvious that the condition of being autonomous requires one to choose moral ends. But, given Haworth’s account of “autonomy” as a supreme value, as an ideal which has priority over values such as liberty, pleasure, and preference satisfaction, I think it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to hold that an autonomous person can afford to be immoral. In this paper I (1) present a brief analysis of Haworth’s conception of autonomy, (2) discuss the sense in which autonomy is a fundamental value, (3) critically evaluate the arguments he advances to show that “autonomy” does not entail commitment to moral ends. The proposition I plan to defend is that Hawoth’s conception of autonomy should mean “self-realization”, otherwise the concept of autonomy would be reduced to a concept of freedom and as such cannot function as an ideal of human conduct in education, legal legislation, and social and personal life.

Journal of Law
Journal of Law

You are Visitor No.

99343

Journal of Law
Journal of Law
Tell your friendsJournal of Law
Journal of Law
Journal of Law

Last Updated

Dec 08, 2019

Journal of Law
Journal of Law
Journal of Law

Please enter your email Here to receive our news

Journal of Law