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This study deals with the development strategy of Egypt since the Revolution of 1952. The conclusion from the study shows that socialism failed to solve Egypt’s critical development problems and left a weighty legacy which in effect makes the present situation more complicated and harder to surmount. The explanation, which is offered here for this failure, is that political consideration pertaining to the ideological predilection of the leaders of Egypt and to power concerns led to the pursuit of a counter-productive development strategy and wrong priorities. In addition, the subjection of the management of the economy to political intervention and the precedence given to the politically expedient have all contributed to a very poor development record of the Egyptian Revolution. At present, the problem has become extremely complicated and intractable politically as well as economically. Moreover, the political will among Nasser’s successors to lead the country out of its economic predicament is very weak. The open-door policy of Sadat which is often referred to as a new strategy and a new start is nothing but a moderate shift in emphasis toward foreign investment and the relaxation of the import substitution policies. It has not created the necessary measures to make it possible to re-orient the Egyptian economy toward growth and export oriented strategy. It constitutes half measures which in certain instances  is more detrimental to development.

The study traces the record of economic change in Egypt since the fifties in detail and underlines the ill-effects of the import substitution strategy. It concludes by making some remarks regarding the measures necessary to move out of the chronic predicament of Egypt’s economic development.